According to Alfred North Whitehead, “the basis of experience is emotional” (1933/1967, 176). Whitehead writes that his philosophy “aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant put his Critique of Pure Reason. This should also supercede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy” (1929/1978, 113).
In what follows, I would like to work through this “critique of pure feeling,” and show how Whitehead opens the way to an affect-based account of human (and not just human) experience.
For Whitehead, the questions of how we feel, and what we feel, are more fundamental than the epistemological and hermeneutical questions that are the focus of most philosophy and criticism (including Kant’s Critiques).
Stephen Shapiro, Pulses of Emotion: Whitehead's Critique of Pure Feeling