Photo by Inggrid Koe on Unsplash

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Love and Mystery​

​Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics
as a Challenge to Whitehead
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Jay McDaniel

A Personal Note

Many years ago, in graduate school, I was taking two courses simultaneously: one on Heidegger's Being and Time and the other on Whitehead's Process and Reality. They were among the best courses I ever took, and the ideas I learned in these courses live with me still today. Yet the two philosophers seemed profoundly different. Part of the difference was stylistic. Heidegger was deeply immersed in the history of Western philosophy, engaging with it through meticulous and profound readings, whereas Whitehead appeared much less rooted in, or aware of, that tradition. Heidegger knew Nietzsche and Hegel well, for example; Whitehead didn't. I often felt that Heidegger was "deep" while Whitehead was "wide"—that Heidegger was penetrating in his analysis, while Whitehead was exploratory. 

At the same time, I recognized that Heidegger addressed existential and ontological questions that Whitehead did not explicitly explore. Heidegger explored the fundamental nature of human existence, authenticity, and the meaning of Being itself in ways that seemed absent from Whitehead’s cosmological and process-oriented inquiries. This made me feel that Heidegger was grappling with a dimension of experience that Whitehead overlooked or considered less central to his project.
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I also noticed that Whitehead demonstrated a far greater interest in positive engagement with science and mathematics than Heidegger seemed to. Both were critical of what Whitehead called "scientific materialism" with its reduction of the world to static objects, but Whitehead more than Heidegger worked with, and enjoyed, the worlds of mathematics and symbolic logic. Whitehead was interested in the ontological status of timeless mathematical relations, Heidegger (in Being and Time) in our everyday experience as it discloses the depths of being. And yet, interestingly, Whitehead seemed much more interested in love and tenderness, in compassion, than Heidegger, especially when he (Whitehead) spoke of love in Part V of Process and Reality, on God. Whitehead felt God's presence as a "tender care that nothing be lost" and of divine love flooding back forth into the earth, not in tyrannical power, but in gentle and life-nourishing possibilities.

By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands. (Whitehead, Process and Reality)

I could not imagine Heidegger speaking in this way. When it came to ultimate matters, Whitehead was about love, and Heidegger about mystery. At least so it seemed to me.

I remember one day when my professor, John Cobb, casually remarked that the two philosophers, Whitehead and Heidegger, did share at least one key idea: both believed that humans do not exist as detached spectators or isolated subjects. Instead, we are always already being-in-the-world, or, as Heidegger would say, Dasein. Cobb further noted that both Heidegger and Whitehead understood our existence as inherently temporal—being and time are, for them, two sides of the same process called "our lives."

Cobb added an intriguing observation: for Whitehead, this mode of existence applies not only to humans but to all sentient beings. "Animals and plants, too, are Dasein," he said. That idea stayed with me and sparked new reflections. I began to see Whitehead and Heidegger as philosophical companions of a sort, despite their differences. I even wondered whether Whitehead’s philosophy might provide a framework for understanding something like eco-Dasein—an extension of Heidegger's concept into a broader ecological context.

Yet, I found myself wrestling with a significant stumbling block. The Whitehead scholars I knew were deeply at home with metaphysical thinking, albeit in a Whiteheadian sense. In contrast, the Heideggerians I encountered were profoundly suspicious of metaphysics, often rejecting it outright. This divergence in attitude toward metaphysical inquiry presented a challenge to seeing the two thinkers as fully aligned. I hope the reflections that follow engage with this tension and shed light on the relationship between these two remarkable philosophers.

The Appeal of Whitehead's Metaphysics

Many process philosophers and theologians are attracted to Whitehead because, in their view, he offers a metaphysical foundation for thinking about God and the world—a foundation that is consonant with the best of modern science, with many aspects of spirituality and religion, with our moral responsibilities to others and ourselves, with the role of aesthetics and beauty in human life, and with the need, throughout the world, to live with respect and care for the community of life. This includes helping build just and compassionate communities that approximate the ideals of a new kind of civilization, an ecological civilization.

The metaphysical foundation Whitehead offers, so they say, is articulated most systematically in his magnum opus Process and Reality (1929), but aspects of it are also found throughout the corpus of his work, including Science and the Modern World (1925), Adventures of Ideas (1933), and Modes of Thought (1938).

Amid their enthusiasm for Whitehead's metaphysics, very few have engaged with, or even seem aware of, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. Perhaps this is because they have not been trained in the history of Western continental philosophy. It may also be because they are repelled—and rightly so—by Heidegger's personal life: his joining the Nazis, his antisemitic tendencies, and his failure to apologize.
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There are some who want to excise Heidegger from the philosophical canon altogether, even as his thinking has had such a huge influence on much of Western philosophy. Still, it seems to me worthwhile to consider his critique and imagine how Whitehead's "metaphysics" would be evaluated by those impressed with Heidegger's critique.
Let us first consider the critique and then turn to a Heideggerian evaluation.

Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is multifaceted and foundational to his philosophical project. His critique centers on the way Western metaphysics, since its inception with Plato and Aristotle, has shaped our understanding of being (Sein) and obscured the fundamental question of what it means "to be." Here are the key elements of Heidegger's critique:

1. Forgetting the Question of Being: Heidegger argues that metaphysics has historically focused on beings (entities, things that exist) rather than being itself. He refers to this as the "forgetting of being" (Seinsvergessenheit). Metaphysics, in his view, reduces being to a mere concept, neglecting the more fundamental, dynamic nature of being as an event or happening.

2. Ontotheology: Heidegger critiques metaphysics as ontotheology, meaning that it conflates the study of beings (ontology) with the conception of a supreme being (theology). In this framework, metaphysics often positions God or an ultimate principle as the grounding entity, thereby treating being as something derived or secondary.

3. Reduction to Presence: In Heidegger’s analysis, metaphysics tends to interpret being as constant presence (ousia in Greek), equating being with what is fixed, stable, or enduring. This view, according to Heidegger, overlooks other modes of being, such as absence, becoming, or the ways in which beings are disclosed through time and history.

4. Technological Framing: Heidegger sees the culmination of metaphysical thinking in the modern era as leading to a technological worldview. This mindset reduces everything, including nature and humanity, to resources or "standing reserve" (Bestand), available for manipulation and exploitation. For Heidegger, this is a direct consequence of metaphysics’ instrumental and calculative approach to being.

5. Domination of Subjectivity: Starting with Descartes, Heidegger criticizes the metaphysical turn towards the subject, where being is understood primarily in terms of the human subject's capacity to represent and control. This anthropocentric orientation, in his view, obscures the ways in which being discloses itself independently of human thought.

6. The End of Metaphysics: Heidegger argues that metaphysics has exhausted itself and reached its "end." This does not mean metaphysics has been resolved or completed, but rather that it has reached a point where it can no longer meaningfully address the question of being. Heidegger sees the end of metaphysics as an opportunity to return to a more original engagement with being.

7. Call for a New Thinking: In response to the limitations of metaphysics, Heidegger proposes a new way of thinking, which he calls "meditative thinking" (besinnliches Denken). This thinking does not seek to dominate or explain being but to listen and attune itself to the way being reveals itself. This involves what Heidegger calls a "step back" from metaphysical thinking to an openness to the mystery of being.

8. The Role of Language: Heidegger also critiques metaphysics for its use of language, which he believes has become too tied to logical and conceptual frameworks. He advocates for a more poetic or primal use of language that can better capture the richness and ambiguity of being.

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is not a rejection but a transformation of its role. He aims to uncover the limitations of traditional metaphysical thinking and open a path toward a more fundamental ontology, where being is no longer taken for granted but approached as an unfolding mystery that demands a more humble and thoughtful engagement. This project underpins much of his work, including Being and Time and his later writings on technology and art.

The Heideggerian challenge to Whitehead—and to metaphysics as a whole—centers on the critique that metaphysical systems contribute to the "forgetfulness of being" (Seinsvergessenheit). Heidegger argues that Western metaphysics has systematically reduced "being" (Sein) to the level of beings (Seiende), focusing on entities rather than the deeper, primordial question of the meaning of being itself. In this view, metaphysics obscures the openness and mystery of being by reducing it to a system of intelligible and categorizable entities. Furthermore, Heidegger critiques metaphysics for turning the world of experience into a collection of objects or entities, held in a spirit of "standing reserve" (Bestand), ready for use, manipulation, and domination by the human mind. The charge against Whitehead, then, is that his understanding of God as "an actual entity" risks reinforcing this ontotheological framework, treating God as a being among beings rather than engaging with the deeper question of being. 

Can Whitehead Meet This Challenge?

Certain aspects of Heidegger's critique might, for many Whiteheadians, appear unworthy of being considered serious challenges. Few would assent to an "end of metaphysics." However, if we assume there is some truth in each of these critiques, it is worth noting that at least some of them do seem to be "met" by Whitehead’s philosophy.

On Reduction to Presence: Much depends on how we define "presence." If it refers to attention to things that are "present-at-hand" in a clear and distinct way, akin to objects of detached visual perception, Whitehead was clearly opposed to such a view. His critique of "experience in the mode of presentational immediacy" in Process and Reality illustrates this opposition. Instead, he emphasized the power and wisdom of intuition and sheer physical feeling, what he termed "experience in the mode of causal efficacy." If "presence" further implies a preference for static being over dynamic becoming, Whitehead’s philosophy is fundamentally at odds with this notion. His entire metaphysical framework invites us to see existence in terms of becoming rather than fixed being. For Whitehead, the essence of existence is not determined by the past but is a matter of how the present becomes. He called this dynamic process of becoming "concrescence."

On the Domination of Subjectivity: Whitehead might carry a degree of guilt here, but it is crucial to recall his "reformed subjectivist principle." This principle asserts that something akin to subjectivity or feeling is present in all entities, not merely in humans. Moreover, this subjectivity does not begin by reaching out to the world in an ego-centered manner, grasping it as an object. Rather, it begins by being affected by the world—physically and emotionally. For Whitehead, the concrescing subject starts in a state of otherness, "thrown" into a world of relationships and interconnections, rather than imposing itself upon them.

On the Call for a New Way of Thinking: It could be argued that Whitehead’s entire philosophical project was an invitation to a new way of thinking. He sought to combine calculative thinking with meditative thinking, mathematics with poetry, and analysis with imagination. His philosophy does not avoid the world but is deeply immersed in the world of becoming. While he speaks of normative ideals and "eternal objects" (pure potentialities), these are not considered more real than the world itself. Rather, they discovered through feeling and participation, not through detached spectatorship.

On the Role of Language: Whitehead appears relatively innocent of Heidegger’s critique concerning language. His writings include passages of poetic beauty, and he insisted that poetic wisdom—such as that found in the works of Wordsworth—is a necessary antidote to mechanistic ways of thinking. Whitehead’s sensitivity to the aesthetic and poetic dimensions of life underlines his commitment to a holistic approach to understanding reality.

In these respects, it may seem to Whiteheadians that Heidegger’s critiques do not entirely apply. Nevertheless, tensions remain, and these are important to acknowledge. 

1. Whitehead’s Creativity and the Question of Being: While Heidegger critiques metaphysical systems for reducing being to entities, Whitehead’s metaphysics introduces a principle that could transcend this limitation: creativity. Creativity, in Whitehead’s thought, is the ultimate metaphysical principle, grounding the existence of all beings without being a "being" itself. This aligns with Heidegger’s insistence on the irreducibility of being (Sein) to beings (Seiende). Creativity is not an entity or resource to be objectified but the generative ground for the process of becoming.
By positing creativity as ultimate, Whitehead gestures toward a metaphysics that does not confine reality within a closed system of beings but instead emphasizes the unfolding, dynamic nature of existence. In this way, Whitehead’s creativity might address the Heideggerian critique, suggesting a metaphysics that remains open to the primordial mystery of existence.

2. Process and Relational Ontology: Whitehead’s philosophy emphasizes becoming over static being, prioritizing events, relationships, and interconnections rather than isolated substances. His concept of "prehension" highlights the relational nature of reality, where every actual entity affects and is affected by others. This dynamic and participatory view resists the reduction of the world to inert objects held in "standing reserve." For Whitehead, the universe is not a collection of resources to be manipulated but a web of interdependent processes, each possessing intrinsic value and subjective aim.

This relational ontology contrasts sharply with the objectifying tendencies of metaphysical traditions critiqued by Heidegger. By framing reality as a process of becoming, Whitehead offers a vision of the world that is inherently dynamic and participatory, countering the instrumentalist perspective that Heidegger identifies with Bestand.

3. God Beyond Ontotheology: Whitehead’s conception of God also challenges the Heideggerian critique, though with certain qualifications. While God is an actual entity in Whitehead’s system, this entity is not static or transcendent in the traditional sense but is both primordial and consequent, engaged in a relational process with the world. The primordial nature of God embodies the infinite potentiality of existence, while the consequent nature integrates and responds to the actual world’s experiences.

However, the challenge remains: does Whitehead’s God, as an actual entity, fall into the ontotheological trap of treating God as "a being among beings"? While this risk exists, Whitehead’s emphasis on creativity as ultimate—and God’s role as an expression of that creativity—offers a way to transcend this limitation. If creativity is understood as akin to Heidegger’s Sein, then Whitehead’s metaphysics could point to a deeper engagement with the question of being itself.

4. Addressing the "Standing Reserve" Critique: Heidegger’s critique of Bestand—the reduction of the world to objects for use and manipulation—finds a counterpoint in Whitehead’s emphasis on intrinsic value and relationality. For Whitehead, every moment of existence is a unique, self-creative event with its own subjective aim. This vision inherently challenges the objectification of the world by recognizing the agency and worth of all entities, no matter how small. Rather than reducing the world to standing reserve, Whitehead celebrates the intrinsic relationality and creativity of existence.

Despite these points of resonance, Whitehead’s metaphysical system might still face aspects of Heidegger’s critique. By constructing a detailed and systematic metaphysics, Whitehead risks falling into the very tendency Heidegger critiques: the transformation of being into an intellectual construct. Heidegger’s emphasis on the openness and mystery of being as an event (Ereignis) suggests that metaphysical systems, however dynamic, may still obscure the primordial experience of being.

Whiteheadian Challenges to Heidegger

In considering Whitehead’s metaphysical vision alongside Heidegger’s critique, it becomes clear that Whitehead offers a distinctive response to some of Heidegger’s concerns while raising additional questions about the normative and relational dimensions of existence. While Heidegger emphasizes the openness and mystery of being, Whitehead foregrounds the presence of ideals and values that beckon humanity and shape the cosmos. This contrast invites further exploration of the following challenges:

The Question of Norms: Heidegger's thinking contains no explicit understanding of God, understood as "a" being—an ontic reality—in relation to which the universe and human life unfold. For Whitehead, such a reality does indeed exist, and God, thus understood, is a source of benevolent ideals by which to live: beauty, truth, goodness, creativity, and peace. A Whiteheadian challenge to Heidegger and to those influenced by him is to ask: Are there ideals by which to live, transcending human life, by which human beings are beckoned and to which they are accountable? Whitehead's answer is clearly Yes.

​The Range of 'Mitsein': Still another challenge concerns the range of what Heidegger calls mitsein or being-with. In Whitehead, being-with includes being with other humans in kindly and caring ways, and also being-with other animals, plants, hills and rivers, trees and stars. Does Heidegger's philosophy offer intuitions conducive to this kind of withness?

Despite these challenges, with are worthy in their own right, Whitehead’s metaphysical system might still face aspects of Heidegger’s critique. By constructing a detailed and systematic metaphysics, Whitehead risks falling into the very tendency Heidegger critiques: the transformation of being into an intellectual construct or mere "objects" in the mind's eye. Heidegger’s emphasis on the openness and mystery of being as an event (Ereignis) suggests that metaphysical systems, however dynamic, may still obscure the primordial experience of being.

However, a synthesis might emerge between Whitehead’s creativity and Heidegger’s Sein. Both thinkers emphasize the generative and relational nature of reality, albeit in different ways. For Whitehead, creativity grounds the ongoing process of becoming; for Heidegger, being unfolds as an event that resists reduction to objects or concepts. By interpreting creativity as an expression of being-as-event, Whitehead’s process philosophy might respond to Heidegger’s challenge, offering a metaphysics that remains open to the mystery and dynamism of existence. It might indeed be a new way of thinking that combines depth and breadth, meditative thinking and mathematical exploration, science and art, love and mystery.