Do you know people who subscribe to one or more of the following beliefs and commitments? I borrow the words from Marlene Laruelle.
The primacy of executive power and majoritarian rule over institutional checks and balances and minority rights.
The sovereignty of the nation-state over supranational institutions and international law.
A realist and transactional foreign policy in a multipolar world interpreted in civilizational terms.
The cultural homogeneity of the nation over multicultural pluralism.
The preservation of traditional hierarchies and values over those associated with left-progressivism.
If so, they are part of a revolt against aspects of liberalism and liberal democracy that you may have come to cherish. In this sense, they are illiberals. Not bad people. Not people worthy of disdain. Not people who are wrong about everything. But they are not traditional liberals. They are illiberals.
The illiberalism I have in mind here is not necessarily theological. It is sometimes associated with traditional religious belief, and many Christian nationalists are illiberal. But some illiberals are entirely secular in outlook. You can be an atheist or agnostic and be illiberal, and you can be a Muslim, Jew, or Christian and be an illiberal.
Communitarianism
Moreover, certain elements of the illiberal critique, not necessarily named above, resonate with themes found in various forms of liberal religion. For example, many illiberals are communitarian in orientation, sharply critical of the hyper-individualism they see as characteristic of modern Western thought—an individualism often reinforced by market economies that reduce human life to atomized consumers and competitors. Many also believe that society can and should be ordered around a substantive vision of the common good—understood as the flourishing of human life and, for some, the earth and its many forms of life. Such convictions are not foreign to liberal religious traditions. Indeed, one can find similar emphases among process theologians.
Localization and the Common Good
Some process theologians, for example John B. Cobb Jr., argued—together with the ecological economist Herman Daly in their book For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future—that what the world most needs is not a homogenized liberal order, but a “community of communities of communities.” In this vision, nations would opt out of the global trade system to a significant degree and cultivate relative self-reliance in meeting essential needs such as energy, materials, and food, rather than remaining wholly dependent on globalized economic systems. Cobb’s position could be described as a form of economic nationalism, though not ethnic nationalism. His concern was not cultural exclusion but ecological sustainability, local accountability, and the protection of communities from the destabilizing effects of unregulated global markets.
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty
Cobb was liberal in his commitment to tolerance, pluralism, persuasion over coercion, and the possibility of harmonizing interests across differences. But he was not liberal in the sense of prioritizing individual preferences over the common good, or in thinking that the common good is merely a projection of private desires. He, like many illiberals and postliberals, believed in a normative universe—one in which people experience God through ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty—and in which people flourish in shared community, indebted to local traditions even as they retain a sense of adventure and loyalty to the world. Cobb and his colleague David Ray Griffin developed what they called a constructive postmodern way of thinking that stressed life and community, not individualism. I doubt that Cobb would have subscribed to any of the beliefs named above. But he would have agreed with the critiques of liberalism insofar as it promotes isolated individualism, a reduction of life to private interests, a neglect of community and tradition, a neglect of the common good. and a rejection of transcendent norms. He was, if not illiberal, then at least postliberal.
Illiberalism and Postliberalism
The purpose of remainder of this page, then, is to introduce readers to illiberalism, understood as a complex movement afoot in the world today that is having significant political and cultural impact and is sometimes confused with populism. Following a growing body of scholarship—especially the work of Marlene Laruelle—I call it illiberalism. The language above, adjacent to the bullets, is hers.
Political actors frequently associated with this term include:
Viktor Orbán – Prime Minister of Hungary, who has explicitly described his system as an “illiberal democracy.”
Vladimir Putin – President of Russia, associated with sovereignist and civilizational narratives.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – President of Turkey, who has consolidated executive power and curtailed institutional checks.
Narendra Modi – Prime Minister of India, linked to majoritarian nationalism.
Jair Bolsonaro – Former President of Brazil, associated with anti-liberal rhetoric and executive-centered governance.
Donald Trump – U.S. political leader whose rhetoric and governing style have often been described by critics as illiberal.
At the same time, it would be misleading to reduce illiberalism to a set of prominent political figures or to treat it as confined primarily to formal politics. Illiberalism is not only a style of governance or a set of executive practices. It is also a way of thinking, a cultural mood, and, in some cases, a civilizational narrative. Small groups and individuals can embody its spirit, and it is easily conjoined with a sense of patriotism and nationalism.
The understanding of illiberalism outlined below draws primarily from the scholarship of Marlene Laruelle, director of the Institute for Illiberal Studies at George Washington University. There are multiple ways the term is used in contemporary debate, but Laruelle’s framework is especially helpful because it aims to be analytical rather than polemical. It seeks to describe illiberalism as a political and ideological phenomenon without reducing it to a moral judgment. Readers interested in alternative interpretations are encouraged to explore other approaches as well. Click here.
The terms illiberalism and postliberalism are sometimes used interchangeably, but they emerged in different contexts and emphasize different concerns.
Postliberalism has developed largely within the Anglo-American intellectual world as a philosophical critique of liberalism’s strong emphasis on personal freedom, consumer choice, and the idea that government should avoid taking sides in moral and cultural debates. Postliberal thinkers argue that this approach—whether expressed in economic policy or cultural life—has weakened communal bonds (family, community) and eroded the shared moral foundations upon which democratic life depends. They call for a renewed focus on the common good, stronger communities, and a politics more openly guided by shared moral commitments.
Illiberalism, by contrast, refers more directly to political movements and governing projects—most visibly in parts of Eastern Europe—that challenge liberal democratic norms and institutions in practice. While the vocabulary remains fluid and overlapping across contexts, what illiberalism and postliberalism share is a critical stance toward liberal modernity and a conviction that liberalism is not simply neutral but reflects its own moral and cultural assumptions. Where they differ lies in emphasis: postliberalism has largely taken shape as an intellectual critique seeking alternatives, whereas illiberalism has become an institutional and electoral force in certain political settings.
With this in mind, I turn to Laruelle’s scholarly framework.
Two Key Dimensions of Illiberalism
Key 1: Illiberalism as Backlash
Illiberalism often emerges as a reaction to liberalism experienced as destabilizing. It is not simply theoretical dissent; it is experiential rejection: “We tried liberalism and did not like the results.” The perceived grievances typically include:
Cultural dislocation from rapid social change
Economic insecurity under globalization
Weakening of local or national sovereignty
Erosion of traditional moral frameworks
Judicial or bureaucratic constraints overriding popular majorities
In this sense, illiberalism is retrospective. It defines itself against liberal universalism, proceduralism, and rights-centered constitutionalism.
Key 2: Illiberalism as a Positive Project
Illiberalism is not merely negation. It proposes an alternative model of political order. While expressions vary by country, five recurring structural features can be identified
1. Primacy of Executive Power and Majoritarianism
Strong executive authority
Preference for electoral mandate over institutional constraint
Suspicion of courts, independent media, and bureaucratic “deep state” actors
Minority rights subordinated to majority will
2. Sovereignty of the Nation-State
Reassertion of national control over borders, law, and policy
Resistance to supranational institutions (e.g., EU-style governance, international courts)
Skepticism toward international law when it limits national autonomy
3. Realist, Transactional Foreign Policy
Multipolar worldview
Civilizational framing of geopolitics
Emphasis on national interest over liberal international norms
Bilateral deal-making rather than rules-based globalism
4. Cultural Homogeneity
Preference for cultural cohesion over pluralistic multiculturalism
National identity framed in civilizational, historical, or religious terms
Immigration policy tied to cultural compatibility
5. Defense of Traditional Hierarchies and Values
Emphasis on family, religion, gender complementarity
Resistance to progressive identity politics
Defense of inherited moral orders
The "Liberalisms" to which various forms of illiberalism react
Illiberal movements typically frame themselves as corrective reactions. They argue that liberalism—across several domains—overreached, destabilized societies, or imposed uniform norms. In different context they are responding to one or some combination of five forms of liberalism
1. Political Liberalism
(Human rights, free press, separation of powers, judicial review)
Core liberal commitments:
Individual rights prior to majority will
Constitutional checks and balances
Independent judiciary
Free press and civil society autonomy
Illiberal critique:
Courts override democratic majorities
Media elites distort national will
Institutional “gatekeepers” block popular sovereignty
Minority protections weaken majority rule
Illiberal counter-proposal:
Majoritarian democracy
Strong executive
Reduced autonomy of oversight institutions
2. Economic Liberalism
(Neoliberalism, deregulation, global capital mobility)
(U.S. dominance, liberal international order, unipolarity)
Core liberal commitments:
Rules-based international order
Humanitarian interventionism
Promotion of democracy abroad
U.S.-led institutional architecture
Illiberal critique:
Hypocrisy and double standards
Regime change wars
Erosion of national sovereignty
Unipolar arrogance
Illiberal counter-proposal:
Multipolarity
Civilizational pluralism
Transactional realism
Rejection of liberal universalism in foreign policy
5. Colonial (or Civilizational) Liberalism
(Western normative dominance framed as universal)
Core liberal assumption:
Western liberal norms are universally valid
Modernization = Westernization
Liberal democracy is the endpoint of political development
Illiberal critique:
Cultural imperialism
Imposition of Western moral frameworks
Delegitimization of non-Western traditions
Epistemic hierarchy privileging Western models
Illiberal counter-proposal:
Civilizational sovereignty
Cultural particularism
Reassertion of national-historical narratives
The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism
"From the rise of populist leaders and the threat of democratic backsliding to the return of great power competition, the backlash against the political, economic, and social status quo is increasingly labeled "illiberal." Yet, despite the increasing importance of these phenomena, scholars still lack a firm grasp on "illiberalism" as a conceptual tool for understanding contemporary trends.
The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism addresses this gap by establishing a theoretical foundation for the study of illiberalism and showcasing state-of-the-art research on this phenomenon in its varied scripts-political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and civilizational.
To do so, the Handbook is organized in eight parts. The first develops the concept of illiberalism by delineating it from other "isms," such as conservatism and authoritarianism. The second highlights the historical and contemporary entanglements between illiberalism and liberalism. The third explores how illiberalism intersects with various political and social identities, such as religion and gender. The fourth examines the political economy of illiberalism. The fifth unpacks the presence of illiberalism in regimes and countries around the world, including Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. The sixth identifies how illiberalism manifests in international relations. The seventh analyzes grassroots expressions of illiberalism. And the eighth probes the theoretical foundations of illiberal thought, linking it to conservatism, postliberalism, and religious doctrines. Bringing together the expertise of dozens of scholars, The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism offers a thorough overview that characterizes the current state of the field and charts a path forward for future scholarship on this critical and quickly developing concept."
Research Professor of International Affairs George Washington University, Washington, DC
Leadership Roles
Director, Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies
Director, Illiberalism Studies Program
Director, Central Asia Program
Co-Director, PONARS-Eurasia
Research Focus
Marlene Laruelle works on the rise of populist and illiberal movements in post-Soviet Eurasia, Europe, and the United States. Trained in political philosophy, she examines how nationalism and conservative values are becoming mainstream across diverse cultural contexts.
Her scholarship focuses particularly on:
Russia’s ideological landscape and its international outreach
Nationhood and regional dynamics in Central Asia
Russia’s Arctic policy
The global diffusion of illiberal thought and populist movements
