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​From Consumerism
​to Ecological Civilization

Corinne Hummel on Marx and Whitehead

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by Jay McDaniel

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"Whitehead the Pragmatist and Marxism as Pragmatism: Deriving Praxis from Philosophies of Living Experience" by Corinne Hummel in Process Perspectives, Volume 44, 2023.

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It is tempting for Western individualists to believe that meaningful social change primarily begins with transformations of the heart and mind, rather than transformations of the economic and material conditions in which people live. The underlying idea is that the latter transformations, important as they are, can only happen if people "think" differently.

Corinne Hummel disagrees, and rightly so. Her ideas resonate with those of Alfred North Whitehead, who argued that all human experience includes both a physical side and a mental side - a side that receives the world as it already exists in its physical and material dimensions, and a side that responds to what is received with creativity of its own. These two sides, so Hummel emphasizes, along with Whitehead are interdependent.
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When we think about ourselves and our world, and, even more profoundly, when we feel and perceive the world around us, we are shaped by what we have physically received from the very world about which we are thinking, including its positive and negative aspects. Our consciousness has been influenced by our materiality. Nevertheless, the material world that we receive has also been affected by our consciousness. The states of affairs in which we find ourselves, whether just or unjust, sustainable or unsustainable, are partly the products of how we (or more accurately, people in power) have imagined the world. If they imagine the world as consisting of isolated substances, they will build communities in which isolated individuals compete for scarce resources. Conversely, if they imagine the world more relationally, they will construct communities in which healthy relations take precedence over competition. In short, thinking and feeling, on one hand, and material conditions, on the other, are dialectically related. 

This dialectical relation is the point of departure for Corinne Hummel's essay: "Whitehead the Pragmatist and Marxism as Pragmatism: Deriving Praxis from Philosophies of Living Experience" in Process Perspectives, Volume 44, 2023. Her aim is to bring Whitehead and Marx into conversation, separating Whitehead to some degree from a less revolutionary tradition, American pragmatism. The final paragraph of the article gives you a sense of her project and its import. She writes:

I think Marxists would agree that a strategic dispensation of Whiteheadian process philosophy has the potential to intervene on the popular ideological front, but if it is our social and material relations within the capitalist structure which have given rise to this illusion of separateness in the first place, then Whitehead’s process philosophy, left to its own devices, is going to be paddling upstream while the world burns. An integration of Whiteheadian philosophy and Marxian philosophy may actually dam the river, and in the green stillness of the reservoir, we may finally see our true and sacred reflection.

The metaphor of paddling upstream, while the world burns, is striking, as is the image of damming the river. What is to be dammed, it seems, are the currents of self-destruction toward which humanity is now headed with global climate change, violence, political authoritarianism, and economic disparities. What is needed is another river in which we human beings swim, respective of, and sensitive to, our inseparable connections with one another and the more than human world: a river in which we can see see their true and sacred reflections in one another and the more than human world.

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Along with other process thinkers, Hummel speaks of this alternative state of affairs as an “ecological civilization.” This is a civilization in people live with a recognition that they are part of, not apart from, the larger web of life and recognize that the whole of life, not human alone, is the moral, historical, and spiritual context of their lives. The need is to build and sustain communities that are creative, compassionate, participatory, diverse, inclusive, humane to animals, and good for the earth, with no one left behind. These communities, in urban and rural settings, are the fundamental units of an ecological civilization.

What prevents us from living in this way? Hummel proposes, along with many others, that we fall into an “illusion of separateness," amid which we wrongly think of ourselves as isolated from others by the boundaries of our skin, identities, and social status. What she adds, not often enough emphasized by others, is that this illusion does not arise from inner confusion alone, but by “our social and material relations within capitalist culture.”

Marxism, then, offers a strategy for attending to our social and material relations, and Whitehead’s process philosophy offers an outlook on life – a “cosmology,” Hummel emphasizes – that can help awaken humanity to the deep connectedness that is always already the case, even if we don’t know it because we are trapped in the illusion.

One value of Hummel's essay is the questions it raises for all of us who advocate process ways of thinking. An obvious question concerns the relation of process thought to Marxism. On this much has been written. If you are new to the subject, I recommend an essay by John Cobb written for a Chinese audience called "Marx and Whitehead." It is written from a Christian perspective, but is easy to understand and germane to the question of relations of Marx and Whitehead to ecological civilization. It was written for a Chinese audience and first delivered in Harbin, China. Even more germane is a book by Philip Clayton and Justin Heizekehr called "Organic Marxism: An Alternative to Capitalism and Ecological Catastrophe." The description of the book provides an inkling of its contents and reminds the reader (at least this reader) of the underlying interests of Hummel's essay:

This “fresh, energetic, and revolutionary manifesto” (Santiago Slabodsky) takes its leads from the core insights of Karl Marx, from process philosophers in China (Taoism) and in the West (Alfred North Whitehead), from ecology, and from the organic practices of sustainable communities. This “postmodern Marxism,” the authors argue, is not deterministic and utopian. It allows for market forces while limiting corruption and excessive profit-taking by the wealthy. In the end, localized systems of production and trade, steeped in the cultural traditions of a given people, are far more sustainable and life-affirming than a globalized economy run by the richest banks and multinational corporations. The book is a call to action. We can no longer sit by passively and allow unlimited consumption by the wealthy when it means that there will be nothing left for our grandchildren. Without a planetary crisis, the rich would remain in power. As we approach the planet’s limits, however, there is no other option but to shift to an organic, ecological civilization. Clayton and Heinzekehr show how scientists and economists, farmers and small business people, artists and religious leaders are coming together around the globe, building communities for the common good.

Let us assume, along with Clayton, Heinzekehr, and perhaps Hummel that a Marxist approach to economic life does not necessarily lie in state ownership of the means of production or in a rejection of market economies, but rather in localized systems of production and trade, steeped in the cultural traditions of a given people; and that these economies are far more sustainable and life-affirming than a globalized economy run by the richest banks and multinational corporations. Let us also assume that one thing that gets in the way of the development of these local economies is an illusion of separation from one another than the more than human world. And let us assume that Whitehead's philosophy can help people overcome the illusion.  With this in mind, three more questions come to mind:

1. How Whiteheadian process philosophy, in Hummel's words,“ intervene on the popular ideological front”? By what means? Through what media? With what language? What role might Whitehead's notion of beauty play in this intervention?
2. What version of Whiteheadian process philosophy would be most helpful for this intervention? His cosmology alone, or his analysis of human experience as well?
3. What role should religion play in a popular intervention, and specifically, what role should Whitehead’s understanding of God play? 

I will start with the second and third questions, with Hummel as my conversation partner, and, at the end, offer a brief reflection on the first. Along the way I bring in a thinker to whom she does not allude but who seems to be to be quite relevant to her project: Thorstein Veblen.

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Hummel proposes that Whiteheadian process philosophy “has the potential to intervene on the popular ideological front.” Would it focus primarily on Whitehead’s cosmology, with its emphasis on a universe of mutual becoming in which every actual entity is, in Whitehead’s words, “present in” every other actual entity? Would it include Whitehead’s idea that each actual entity is an act of self-enjoyment, with an aim toward satisfaction, and with value for itself? In other words, would it include Whitehead’s attention to individuality as well as community?

I ask this out of my own experience with teaching Whitehead in China where many people are most interested in Whitehead, not because he helps break free of the illusion of separateness, but because he leaves space for an appreciation of the intrinsic value of each and every human being. But let me back up.

Hummel’s general argument is that Marx is much more helpful in understanding the social dimensions of such experience, especially under global capitalism, than Whitehead and the cosmology-oriented thinkers who draw inspiration from him. She puts it this way:

Whitehead zoomed out from contemporary naturalism, so fraught with substance dualism, to develop a cosmological picture; accommodating a process-ontological panexperientialism while skipping over the specificities of human experience.

She is particularly interested in how Marx presents the social conditions that embody and lend support to Whitehead's idea that, deep down, we, as living beings, are truly connected to one another, both positively and negatively, not least through our economic relations.

For my part, I am quite sympathetic to her critique but disagree with her caricature of Whitehead as more interested in zooming out, beyond human experience, than honing in on the dynamics of living experience. I think this may be more true of Whiteheadians (of a speculative type) than Whitehead. In point of fact, Whitehead drew upon immediate human experience in much of "Process and Reality" and "Modes of Thought" to illustrate what he means by "an actual occasion of experience." Living experience was, for him, as much of an example of actual occasions as quantum events in the depths of atoms. The idea that Whitehead's idea of "actual entities" is primarily about sub-microscopic realities is a mistake.

There is a phenomenological dimension to Whitehead's thinking. Even existential. He offers, in fact, a metaphysics of living human experience, not simply through the general theme of interconnectedness and inter-becoming but through his attention to the "subjective immediacy" (Whitehead's phrase) of lived experience: to prehending (feeling the presence of other actualities and of abstract ideas); subjective forms (the emotions that clothe our perceptions); decision (the momentary act of choosing certain possibilities in the immediacy of a moment, thereby actualizing others); subjective aim (the sense of purpose, including a desire for satisfaction, that permeates every act of experience); an awareness of potentialities and relative possibilities in conceptual, imaginative, and anticipatory feelings; the sense of privacy (not simply connectedness) that qualifies each moment, including what he calls self-enjoyment; and the lure toward beauty and harmony as pervasive features of human life.

It is not surprising that many have seen parallels between Whitehead and continental phenomenologies, and that later in his life, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty was turning to Whitehead as a companion thinker. If Whiteheadian and Whitehead-influenced thinkers built upon these themes as offering the seeds of a Whiteheadian perspective, they would happily come across as less abstract and, for some, less lost in their thoughts. Whitehead himself did not "skip over the specificities of human experience."

However, none of this negates the fact that Hummel is on target when she notes the neglect in Whitehead, no less than many others of western liberal persuasion, of the almost overwhelming role of global capitalism in our lives, both economically and culturally. Whitehead was insufficiently attentive to the social, economic, and political dimensions of living human experience. If you want to consider this side of life, Hummel is right: turn among others to Marx. And not just the side of Marx interested in ownership of the means of production but also that side interested in the psychological and social sides of capitalism, Marx brings the cultural focus into light with his consideration, for example, of commodity fetishism. Under capitalism, we do indeed make a fetish of "things" - seeking to own more and more of them and, in the process, aiming to be envied by others. To consider this aspect of capitalism in human life, I turn to Thorstein Veblen.

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Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), a prominent American economist and sociologist, introduces several key concepts in his work that shed light on the dynamics of modern capitalism and social behavior. He was not himself a Marxist, but his ideas illustrate th cultural side of what Marxist critique. "Conspicuous consumption" refers to the practice of individuals conspicuously displaying their wealth and social status through lavish and often wasteful spending on luxury goods and services. This behavior is driven by the desire to signal one's high social standing and gain recognition in a competitive social hierarchy. "Conspicuous leisure" names the conspicuous display of one's non-productive time or leisure activities, such as extravagant vacations or leisure pursuits that have no practical purpose. This, too, serves as a way to assert one's social position and separate oneself from the working class. "Pecuniary emulation" is the tendency of individuals to imitate the consumption patterns and lifestyles of those in higher social classes, often at great financial strain to themselves. And the "predatory instinct" names what it sounds like, the impulse to conquer under the auspices of competition. These concepts collectively illustrate Veblen's observations on how social status and prestige drive consumer behavior and shape societal norms within a capitalist framework.

It seems to me that these phenomena are the social world in which people throughout the world live and move and have their being. Certainly, these habits of heart and mind are nurtured by advertising and peer pressure. Together they form the heart of consumer culture: itself a culture of envy and greed. Is capitalism, per se, the problem? So much depends on what is meant by capitalism. I leave it to others -- Clayton, Heinzekehr, and Hummel, for example - to further define it. Buddhists will tell us that the problem also lies in our psychological disposition toward greed, hatred, and envy, which operates in any economic system. But certainly, at the very least, the ethos of capitalism - with its four poisons of conspicuous consumption, conspicuous leisure, pecuniary emulation, and the predatory instinct - contributes significantly to disease (the dukkha) of our lives..

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Many in China today believe that Marxism alone, as they have received it, cannot solve the problems they face because, as they see it, it lacks a spiritual dimension. Some among the scholars turn to aesthetics as an alternative, because aesthetics gives them a context to talk about feelings and a sense of beauty. It is not surprising, then, that some Chinese also appreciate the religious side of Whitehead. They share this appreciation with Christians around the world who find Whitehead’s notion of God especially meaningful. I think, for example, of process-oriented Christians in Africa, Africa, and Latin America; where Christianity is growing by leaps and bounds, even as it can seem to be in decline in Western Europe and the United States. For them, what makes process philosophy so valuable is not that it speaks of inter-becoming or that it is compatible with science, but because it speaks of a truly loving God. Their companions in the West are the myriad post-evangelicals in the open and relational theology movement.

Would a “a strategic dispensation of Whiteheadian process philosophy on the popular ideological front” include reference to Whitehead’s understanding of God? If so, would it focus primarily on the way that God is present and active in the world through the call of the not-yet, or would it also focus on Whitehead’s idea, found in Part V of Process and Reality, that God is an eternal companion to the world’s sufferings (“a fellow sufferer who understands”) who seeks to save the world “with a tender care that nothing be lost” and whose defining feature is love? In Whitehead’s words:

It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present.

As I read Hummel’s essay, it seems to me that her answer to these questions is: The strategic intervention would focus primarily on the notion of inter-becoming, with its full-blown emphasis on relationality not isolation; its reference to God would be muted since, for many with whom she is in conversation, the word itself and its associations are problematic; and even with any inclusion of God, the emphasis would be on the call of the not-yet but not the tender care of an eternal companion.

Of Whitehead’s concept of God, she writes:

Whitehead uses the word ‘God’ as there is no better word to meaningfully relay the relationality between what is and what becomes; it needs to be a word which evades concretizing in any given moment in time...Thus, Whitehead gives us a ‘dipolar’ God, knowing all that becomes and does not become, as the super-transcendent factor of novelty in each moment of becoming, which evades our senses of cause and effect. What is meaningful for those of us who have believed in an interventionist creator God is that we get to retain our notion of imago dei; we can always willfully choose to create the good, the just, and the beautiful in each moment, enacting intervention in contrast to the information we inherit through our experience. Whitehead’s philosophy has been singularly useful to Christians in the project of deconstructing from the profaned and alienating institution that Christianity has largely become. However, it may fall short in serving the constructive purposes its proponents attempt to apply it to, such as moving toward an “ecological civilization,” which Marxists would assert requires nothing short of a global socialist revolution.​

I am not sure what she means by “evades our senses of cause and effect.” I suspect that she has in mind God as a source of novelty in life, an introduction of novel possibilities which are unexpected and promising. But it seems clear that images of God as a companion are not what she finds helpful in a strategic intervention on a popular ideological front.

For my part, I suspect that people in many parts of the world will find Whitehead helpful through, not apart from, his emphasis on God as a loving companion, and that what they appreciate about this side of God is not that it is super-transcendent or even that it calls people forward, but that it provides a sense of comfort and peace while living in the present. I realize that this will sound naïve to Western academics, but I am interested in Whitehead's process philosophy as it might actually inform outlooks on life at a popular level.

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Hummel would be the first to acknowledge that the language of her essay is not the kind of language that might speak to a popular audience. She is speaking to a Western academic audience, not, for example, to an Islamic audience in Pakistan, or Christian audience in Nigeria. Or, for that matter, to an organic gardener in the United States, with an interest in spirituality. And yet she rightly points to the need to find a Whitehead process philosophy language that is truly understandable. Many have tried, and I am among them. See Twenty Key Ideas in Process Thought and the Four Hopes of the Process Movement. But even these attempts (including my own) are not entirely up to the task. Many are too prosaic, insufficiently lyrical, and overly reliant on the written word at the expense, say, of images, music, and stories.

My own sense is that Whitehead's process philosophy can make a dent in the collective consciousness only when people see connections between its ideas and their own lived (Hummel would say living) experience, including their joys and well as their sorrows, their hopes as well as their fears, and when it is linked not only with a sense of inter-becoming but also with a sense of beauty. Beauty is, after all, the telos of the universe, says Whitehead. And the appeal of beauty in the human heart is more than an appeal to understanding, it is an appeal to what makes life worth living, Beauty comes in many forms: natural beauty, moral beauty, soul beauty, artistic beauty, and tragic beauty. 

It was this beauty that I heard in the final phrase of Hummel's essay: "in the green stillness of the reservoir, we may finally see our true and sacred reflection." The promise of her ongoing work, I suggest, lie in incorporating this sense of Beauty, be it Whiteheadian or Marxian or both, into her analysis. She might build upon whatever intuitions gave rise to the beauty of her final sentence. Yes, we need to dam the currents of self-destruction, but we also need to peer into "the green stillness of the reservoir, where we may see our true and sacred reflection."  

Is it possible that the sense of inter-becoming to which Hummel is so rightly sensitive might evoked, not only by warnings of catastrophe but also by intuitions of beauty? Surely so. Whitehead speaks not only of the inter-becoming of all things but also of their lived experience, their subjective immediacy, amid which they are bursting forth with vitality and value. In Whitehead beauty and value are closely related; value is the self-enjoyment of harmony and intensity in living experience.

Living experience is Hummel's term. Whitehead did not use the term panpsychism or panexperientialism, but he did speak of prehending, of feeling, as happening anywhere and everywhere that actuality unfolds, be it in a moment of human or animal life, or in the interior depths of a drop of water on a green leaf. And he spoke of that immediacy, that self-enjoyment, as valuable in its own right. Consumer society misses this. It sees the world of "things" as mere facts devoid of value, useful for instrumental purposes. Whitehead invites a mode of seeing more deeply: of seeing our true and sacred reflection in the green stillness. Hummel invites the same.







* Corinne Hummel is a second year PhD student at the Claremont School of Theology, studying philosophy of religion with a focus in process studies. She lives in Seattle where she had focused her interests in sustainable urbanism prior to pursuing her studies in philosophy. As a philosophy student, Corinne remains dedicated to thinking about ecological issues, drawing on her past experiences and her continued study of political economy